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I B a n k e r , 1 8 9 7 Genesis of religion. 
THE GENESIS OP RELIGION. 
We begin with a simple recognition of religion as a social 
fact. True, there is possibly room for contesting one implication 
of this premise-- the universality of religion as a social fact. 
Not much depends upon i t , yet as the evidence is not all on one 
side^fairness requires the recognition of i t . Twenty-seven years 
ago Sir John Lubbock made a catalogue of unreligious tribes with 
his authorities for them. Later and more careful investigation 
has however shown many statements of fact upon which he relied to 
have been illfounded and his conclusions erroneous. Much depends 
upon the definition of religion. If i t include only the higher 
forms of belief in spiritual beings and their relations to mankind 
then of course religion can be predicated only of people possessed^ 
of an advanced culture. If however the boundary lines between 
is H 
• *Prehistoric Times, p. 564. 
"Origin of Civilization, p. 122'. ^y' \ 
OTyler: Primitive Culture, Vol. I, p. 418. A \ 
••Spencer: Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, p. 2Q&? t 
religion and superstition^be too indefinite for indication, and 
the distinction between them one of degree and not of kind--- as 
it is the unquestionable tendency of present day scholars to 
believe-*-— then Mr. Ward's statement seems beyond controversy, 
"The study of the idea« of primitive man is nearly the same as the 
X 
study of the genesis and history of religion." "Nothing was 
earlier developed; nothing has manifest itself more universally", 
says Dr. Thomas K. Davis. The statement is pretty broad. The 
exact relation^logically and chronologically, between religion 
and the family, for instance, is ,at least,open to discussion. 
In the main however the statement is correct. Two things may 
be stated as facts. First, all peoples^in a l l times^and a l l 
places concerning whom we have reliable information are possessors J
 j 
x
 Dynamic Sociology, Vol. I, p. 195^ x
 John Piske: The Idea of God, p. 66.* 
^Wooster Quarterly, October, 1896, p. 19. 
of r e l i g i o n . Second, the same ideas, customs ana institutions, 
perpetually recurring among primitive peoples,offer apparently 
solid ground for the conclusion, that i f we could obtain reliable 
information as to a l l others, we should find them,too,religious. 
So that while i t is true that absolute certainty, as to each and 
every tribe that has ever existed^would require direct information 
concerning each information for the gaining of which the times 
are now tardy s t i l l , there is a f a i r degree of security in the 
x. 
assertion that •religion is practically coexrensive with man". 
This religious fact we are to consider as a social fact; 
that i s , we are to study i t as manifest in the l i f e of the race. 
The material for our investigation consists of the religious 
thoughts and feelings and deeds of mankind; and these are to be 
XPairbairn: Philosophy of Religion and History, p. 13. 
considered as purely the products of human l i f e . Doubtless there 
are abundant grounds both within and without the sociological 
field, upon which to assert the truth, or the falsity
y
of particular 
religious ideas, and the consequent propriety or impropriety^ of 
particular religious conduct. We are not concerned with this. 
No opinion is advanced as to any of these natters. Our investi-
gation is confined to one particular field and aims to be histori-
cal in method rather than philosophical. 
This fact religion is obviously of the largest import. 
That it has been so regarded by thinkers, from the beginning^ is 
proven by the place given it in a l l literature. In no department 
of literature does it hold a more prominent place, than in that 
which is devoted to the study of society. It is one of the prime 
forces which have shaped the social institutions of the world. 
Next to those primary forces, the desire to preserve self^and the 
desire to propagate kind, the religious impulses of men have been 
the most potent social force. Indeed^it has often been held 
X 
to be the primary force; and it may fairly be questioned if the 
two former mentioned impulses, are not so thoroughly fused and 
blended with the religious impulse^as to defy other than a 
theoretical separation. 
This social prominence of religion has always thrust itself 
upon the student of society, demanding an explanation. And the 
demand has called forth a multitude of theories. "Natural 
Histories of Religion" did not begin with Mr. Hume; they are as 
old as thought. Whenever man has made an effort to understand 
himself as a social being he has made an effort to explain the 
g 
nature and genesis of religion. True, no doubt, much of his work 
*DeCoulangesI The Ancient City, 
^Pairbairne: Philosophy of Religion and History, p. 17 
in this line has been crude. Oft-times he has done l i t t l e else 
than repeat a traditional account. Sometimes he has reason^ 
and lesB often, he has investigated,according to his light. On 
the whole,theories of the ethnic religions may be reduced to 
three. 1. They are the remains in varying states of disinte-
gration of an original supernatural all-sufficient revelation. 
2* They are the fruits of man's intuitive recognition of his 
relation to spiritual and supernatural beings. 3. They are the 
natural and necessary outcome of the evolution of man. Born of 
human nature, their conception is due to the experiences of that 
human nature. 
The fi r s t two of these views call for no discussion
y
 now. 
The practical demonstration that human history has always tended 
upward has absolutely discredited theory number one. The 
psychology of the las t half century has taken the foundation from 
theory number two. The same sciences^which have abolished the 
f i r s t two theories^ have powerfully reinforced and explained the 
t h i r d . 
This account of the nature and o r i g i n of r e l i g i o n i s presented 
in various ways which shade into each other. It i s a long 
distance from the Epicurean dictum "That fear has created the 
gods", to the elaborate and careful doctrines of Tyler and Spencer. 
In the main however they arrree that primitive r e l i g i o n s express 
ideas l i k e other ideas, are the product of thought, and tr> ,t 
thought i s the c h i l d of exrerience. The primitive man i s con-
fronted by two problems, himself, and the universe; r e l i g i o n i s 
his answer. Not that he recognizes these problems, and 
O 
the primitive man theory of things. That i s to say,— r e l i g i o u s 
KAnimism. °Pe 
^ P r i n c i p l e s of Sociology. ^ 
i'Hearne: The Aryan Household, Ohap. I . 
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deliberately attacking them as such^ presents a religious system 
as their solution;-but that his experience of himself, his fellows, 
and the world, presents to him phenomena and an explanation of 
them, sometimes in sequence, sometimes simultaneously, or even 
sometimes in a reverse order of sequence. 
It must be confessed that the facts upon which to rest the 
/ 
theory are found in a land of shadows^where the lines which 
separate things waveband vision may easily be deceived; yet on the 
whole, the evidence seems fairly clear, and to admit of iut one 
interpretation. In the primitive man's experience^there are 
many events, peculiarly fitted to give rise to that which we call 
religion. As soon as he begins to think at all,the phenomenon 
of his own being asks an explanation— one which is not readily 
forthcoming. Possibly^dreams fir s t suggest the train of ideas 
which results in the religious explanation. The conditions and 
customs of primitive l i f e make that l i f e a series of alternative 
feasts and famines. Thus are produced the physical conditions 
from which come dreams of great vividness. The dreamer is not 
trained to nice discrimination of his mental states, and his 
dreams suggest actual experiences. They remain in his memory, 
after the sleep is passed, and the events^which have really taken 
place only in the irregular activity of his brain, are believed in 
as realities of experience. And here, two, separate, yet 
analogous
y
notions arise*- One as to the dreamer himself-- one as 
to other beings. The events of his dream have occurred at a 
distance from the place in which he lay down to sleep, and in which 
he finds himself when he awakes; his wife and others who have been 
present while he slept, t e s t i f y that his body has not moved from 
that p o s i t i o n . He feels forced to conclude, that, while his 
physical man has remained i n his hut, himself has been absent 
x 
at a feast, or i n a b a t t l e , or on the chase. With him,in his 
dream were friends, acquaintances,or enemies, whose bodies, he 
has reason to believe, were at the same time, far distant from the 
l o c a l i t y where he met them. And by the same t r a i n of reasoning, 
by which he has arrived at a conception of his own d&j&Jktty, he 
reaches one^of t h e i r s . Thus in the idea of his own absence from 
the body i n dreams, and in that of the absence of others from 
their hodies, not alone when they dream, but when he dreams of 
them,he has the ground work for a philosophy of s p i r i t u a l things. 
To this view the phenomena of swoon, appoplexy, catalepsy, f a i n t i n g 
from wounds or weakness, which he often observes i n others, as well 
as experiences i n himself seem perfectly to conform. In a l l 
X Lubbock: Origin of C i v i l i z a t i o n , p. 126. 
these cases the body i s there, but the pecul iar thinrr, by which he 
dist inguishes man, i s not there. The obvious explanation, and 
the one which he a d o p t i s ^ t h a t of a second self who leaves the 
body, and again returns to i t . The striking resemblance between 
some of these states and death, the impossibility, in many cases, 
of distinguishing them from death, and the facts,that some whom 
he regards as dead revive, while others whom he has before seen 
revive from a seemingly l i k e state^ f i n a l l y do not revive, these 
and kindred facts easily lead him to conclude that death is but 
a longer absence from the body. Ere this the shadow has been 
observed, and byayery simple mental process, identified with this 
"alter er-o" . Now i t is observed, that with death the breath 
ceases, and there is a further* identification of this breath with 
the shadow s e l f , who now receives a name-- the same in nea -ly a l l 
languages— soul, s p i r i t , ghost. 
*T i ske : The Idea of God, pp. 67 and 6 
Having arrived at a satisfactory explanation of himself, i t 
is easy for the embryo philosopher, as his expanding nine! demands 
an explanation of the external universe, to carry over to i t the 
same theory which has f i t t e d his own case so w e l l . Thus the 
various facts and forces of nature, from bird and beast to tree 
and grass, from rrleamin^ star to clod, are endowed with a 
s p i r i t u a l nature. 
The separation of the soul from the body, which thus comes 
to be regarded as the essence of death, becomes the ground of a 
doctrine of i m o r t a l i t y , and i t only needs that primitive man 
should draw the obvious conclusion, that the future l i f e is just 
l i k e t h i s , and indeed, keeps up a continual connection with t h i s , 
to find reason for those offerings which speedily develop into 
s a c r i f i c e and l i b a t i o n : while the family t i e , the recurring 
seasons, and the various aspects of the heavens give r i s e to 
deities with their c u l t s . 
A l l t h i s seems very simple. The process however i s less 
simple than a cursory description of i t . Were oxir primitive man 
a mere thinking machine, extremely narrow and uncultivated in 
observation, but measurably l o g i c a l i n his reasoning, the story 
as thus told might f i t his case f a i r l y w e l l . But he is not. 
Rude and uncultured as he i s when r e l i g i o n i s born i n him, he 
yet the most marvelous combination of doubts, fears, f e e l i n g s , 
dreams, and guesses. The path by which he reaches that definite 
conception of s p i r i t u a l beings^ which we c a l l r e l i g i o n , so f a r 
from being a straight and broad one, i s most narrow, and tortuous, 
as well as being so long, th;:t no man can measure i t . The 
experiences and observations which make the raw material of his 
doctrine, are of myriad numbers, and almost countless types. 
While the psychological processes by which he works these materials 
^Primitive Culture, V ol, I, p. 428. 
up into a r e l i g i o n , are almost past finding out. One proposi-
t i o n however, may he stated with a f a i r degree of c e r t a i n t y . 
Into his theories, as into a l l r e l i g i o u s doctrines there goes 
a vast amount of f e e l i n g ; vastly more than the writers upon the 
subject have admitted. For the thing which distinguishes r e l i g i o n 
from a mere explanation of phenomena i s the presence of f e e l i n g , 
not simply as a sequence of the explanation, but as a part, and 
indeed, the essential part of both the phenomena and the explana-
t i o n . And while i t i s , no doubt, true, t h a t * r e l i g i o n i s the 
primitiv e man's natural philosophy*, i t i s vastly more than that, 
"at u r a l philosophy does not so mix i t s e l f with a l l the most 
hidden and secret springs of human l i f e as r e l i g i o n has done. 
And when we hear, so r e l i a b l e , and so purely an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
authority, as ?'r. George J . Romanes saying, "The sub-conscious 
x
Hearne: Tne Aryan Household, p. 17. 
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(and therefore unafjalyzable 5 influences, due to the experiences of 
l i f e " are potent, both i n his mental processes and i n furnishing 
material f o r his views, we may w e l l believe, that these "sub-
conscious influences*-- the complex of a myriad experiences, aided 
and abetted by those multitudinous f e e l i n g s , of which he i s 
conscious, but whose meaning he does not understand, have wrought 
potently i n producing the r e l i g i o u s ideas of rudimentary man. 
That i t has aone so, I believe a careful scrutiny of the psycholog-
i c a l processes, by which the p r i m i t i v e man arrives at his r e l i g i o n , 
w i l l r e v e a l . 
These r e l i g i o u s ideas originate i n an attempt to explain 
phenomena. To understand the ideas aright then, we must 
sc r u t i n i z e three things: f i r s t , the f a c u l t y by which the explana-
t i o n i s formulated. Second, the phenomena which are explained. 
-* Thoughts on R e l i g i o n , p. 100. 
Third, the operation of the faculty i n reaching the explanation. 
As to the f i r s t . At a glance, any special scrutiny senns 
superfluous. Solutions of problems are performed by the reasoning 
f a c u l t y , and i t i s one and the same fa c u l t y whether i t s possessor 
be a p r i m i t i v e , uncultured, or a developed, highly cultured 
being. The truth s
r
ems too clear for discussion. Rut i s i t 
so clear ? I f the theory of human evolution be true-- and i f i t 
be not true, this discussion i s e n t i r e l y superfluous— mind i s as 
much a product of evolution as i s body. That of course means 
that mind, as we Know i t , i s the re s u l t of i n f i n i t e s i m a l modi-
f i c a t i o n s , through an i n d e f i n i t e period of time. I t i s absurd 
to say, that the primitive mind— the mind i n which consciousness 
i s just bom,--is the counterpart of the developed mind of adult 
humanity. As a matter of f a c t , i t i s well understood that the 
two are vas t l y d i f f e r e n t , not only i n degree but i n k i n d . And 
the steps by which mind comes into being are something like the 
following. (a) Irritability; (b) Sensation; (c) Perception; 
(d) Consciousness; (e) Memory; (f) Representation; (g) Understand-
ing. Of course a l l this must be taken "cum grano salis" . That 
sensation and perception in a way imply consciousness all recog-
nize. The truth, no doubt, is, that the three are builded 
together. None the less true is i t , that sensation is the 
original and primary, out of which all the other faculties are 
X 
developed; and that intellectual development is a process of 
growing away from the primary into the later and higher faculties. 
This indicates the fact, that the primitive mind is dominated 
by feeling. In it a minimum of reason is buried in a maximum 
of feeling like "two grains of wheat in two bushels of chaff". 
All the rational processes are modified, and in a large measure 
1 / XLefevre; Philosophy, p. 312. 
8 Romanes; The Origin of Human Facultyt 
<fWard; The Psychic Factors of Civilization, pp. 93 and 9 
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in val idated, by the intrusion into them of this element of feeling. 
Conclusions are as much, or more, the product of that instinctive 
feeling which we, inaccurately, c a l l "intuition" as, of logical 
processes; and when those conclusions are drawn, the Mement 
of feeling remain^in them.. 
Hy the terms of our hypothesis, religion is one of the 
earl i e s t , ana most primitive, product of the human mind. The 
conclusion seems inevitable, that into religious ideas, from the 
side of the arent in their formation, there has always ^one a 
larre element of f e e l i n r . 
Second.-- When we turn to the material, of religious ideas,— 
the jhenomena, in an attempt to understand which, these ideas have 
arisen-- we r'ind this element s t i l l more prominent. Beginning 
with dreams, --we are confronted by the fact that the chief 
element in the dream is the feeling of the dreamer. "Its 
-19-
intensity i s as great as that of a sensation given i n direct 
x 
perception, and i t is as such that i t i s regarded by the dreamer." 
Were i t not for this f a c t , the dream would not be remembered, 
and we should never have a philosophy of dreams, under the name 
of r e l i g i o n . "The mind takes an interest only i n that which 
S 
arouses the feelings." Ordinarily " i n dreams the force of 
) 
attention i s greatly diminished;* and this finds i t s explanation, 
in the fact that "dreams are dominated by ideas of sinht and 
sound" i n which, the feelings are seldom stimulated to any great 
degree. It i s only when some dream more v i v i d than usual, and 
which affects the f e e l i n g , as a blinding l i g h t , or a discharge of 
a r t i l l e r y affects the sense, that the dream i s remembered. Then 
the impression made by the dream,is by the dreamer,referred simply, 
*
J
w1f£u,ndt; Human and Animal Psychology, p. 325. 
^Ladd; Physiological Psychology, p. 79. 
/ Baldwin; Hand Book of Psychology, Vol. I , p. 185. 
<5>Wundt; Ibid, p. 325. 
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and solely, to the external object which he believes himself to 
X 
have seen or heard in his dream. It is thus remembered and 
becomes the subject of subsequent thought. The element in the 
dream, which arrests his attention, and compels recollection, 
is the feeling, which he conceives to be due to an actual ex-
perience, utterly failing to discriminate between the imaginary, 
o 
and the real. Thus that which is,indeed, wholly feeling subject 
ively induced, is interpreted, as being sensation due to an ex-
ternal relation. The sensations of sight and feeling, which 
dominate dreams, are those which are most easily revivable, so 
that, when the representative faculty places before the mind the 
vision, or the sound, of the dream, the feelings of the dream 
reappear with marked distinctness, to take their place in the 
XWundt; Human and Animal Psychology, p. 213 r 
" Shoup; Mechanism and Personality, p. 205/^ 
./Baldwin; Hand Book of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 84. 
"Sir William Hamilton; Metaphysics, Bowen's Ed. p. 320. 
oWundt; pp. 326 and 327. 
/Bain; The Emotions and the Will, p, 89. 
conception which the dreamer forms. 
So far then as dreams, the primary material of r e l i g i o u s 
ideas, are concerned, they are wholly matters of f e e l i n g , only 
misinterpreted by the "hocus pocus" of a mind i n which, reason i s 
held in a solution of f e e l i n g . 
Passing to the swoon, appoplexy, catalepsy, and kindred 
phenomena, which are amalgamated with dreams i n p imitive 
r e l i g i o u s theories; i t i s to be observed, 1, that i n so far as 
they are the experiences of the individual himself, they are 
substantially identical with the dream. Swoon from weakness, 
hunger, or loss of bloody i s accompanied by sensations, scarcely 
capable of discrimination from the feelim? of dreams, even by the 
cultivated mind-- much less by the rudimentary one. As to the 
sensations accompanying appoplexy, etc., i t is d i f f i c u l t to say. 
I f i n d nothing of them i n the books, and am unable to meet any one 
-22-
who has experienced them, and has a s u f f i c i e n t l y v i v i d recollec-
t i o n , and enough discrimination, to throw satisfactory l i g h t on 
the subject* It would,howver, seem probable, that these sensa-
tions, too, are readily assimilated to the feelings of a dream 
W 
* 
or a nightmare. So that these do not r e a l l y furnish any addition-
a l data to the primitive philosopher. 2, When these are matters, 
not of his own experience, but seen in others, he interprets 
them in the l i g h t of his own experience, or of the theories which 
are held by himself and his neighbors i n common. 
Then we turn to the other elements of primitive religious 
i d e a s — the shadow, the breath, etc., we discover that they 
are l a t e r i n takin^ their place i n the theory, and are only 
interpreted i n conformity with theories already formed, and form' 
no proper part of the subject matter of this t h e s i s . 
-23-
Third.-- At the opening of the discussion of the psychological 
processes, by which these sensations, feelings and perceptions, 
are wrought up into religious ideas, we are confronted by, almost 
insuperable d i f f i c u l t i e s . If a l l primitive mfcn had a certain 
fund of this material, and went quietly about his endeavor to 
gain an understanding of i t , unvexed and uninterrupted by new 
dreams and new experiences, the task would be simpler. Were his 
reasoning faculty clear and undistorted, how- ver weak his powers, 
i t would be s t i l l simpler. But neither of these things is true. 
These ideas were not formed at a s i t t i n g . Who can r^ive us the 
measure of the centuries which elapsed between the f i r s t impression 
which was subsequently interpreted into religious idea, and the 
f i r s t religious idea ? And during that period what multitudes, 
and what varieties of dreams, swoons, shadows, and feelings were 
experienced ! In that rude, wild l i f e , the days and the nights 
-24-
were quick with myriads of phenomena, alike adding to the new 
material for his theorizing, modifying his f a c u l t i e s , and l i v i n g 
direction to his mental processes ; so that, r e a l l y the best we 
can do, in the way of understanding them is to give a shrewd 
guess. 
To be^in then with the dream. We have noted that the ele-
ment in i t which causes i t to be remembered is that of feeling. 
It has also been mentioned that with the recollection of the 
dream the feeling reappears with marked distinctness. There is 
indeed a resurrection, to a l l appearances, of certain sensation 
experienced in the dream. "Peelings produced by recollections 
nearly equal real sensation in intensity, and sometimes are 
localized." The feeling of the dream thus compels i t s recollec-
ts 
tion, and the recollection reproduces the feeling. 
X ̂ ain; The Emotions and the W i l l . 
JfScripture; Thinking, Feeling and Doing, p. 223, 
oaiddinfcs: The Principles of S o c t o i o ^ ^ f>/u^ 
importance to dreams. 
These dreams, varying in character, are yet by the dreamer, 
a l l assimilated to one fundamental notion, the primary element in 
which is feeling . Concurrently with his dreams he experiences 
waking emotions— fear, anger, love, t h r i l l him through and 
through. The nervous panic, into which these throw him, i s to 
his undiscriminating mind of the same general order with the 
fleelin^ of his dreams; and his contemplation of i t leads him to 
the conclusion that i t is l i k e the other and proceeds from the 
same source. Then comes hysteria or egstacy— produced at f i r s t 
by some accident within or without, and a new feeling is assimilat-
ed to that which was already known, and the whole class becomes 
data for his theorizing. 
Now this feeling, i t is true, is not thought; i t must be 
* Primitive Culture, Vol. I . 
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translated into thought before i t can become knowledge. But' 
feeling and ideation take place side by side and each modifies 
X 
the other. "Peelings as such— pleasures, pains, and mental 
excitement-- are always incorporated with intellectual states, 
and by that means, are differentiated, held, sustained and revived? 
And in one who regards his feelings as the product of relations 
to external beings, as the primitive man does, the sensations 
of his dream, the feelings are a ma in part of the subject matter 
of thought. Even i f he be only thinking upon the external 
object, memory produces a picture of i t , and that picture recalls 
o 
i t s unseen qualities, and its main quality is its capacity to 
produce certain feeling, of which the dreamer is aware. These 
things suffused his mind in feeling, and a l l his intellectual 
processes,in relation to this subject, are so submerged fin feeling, 
xwundt; pp. 211 and 221. ^ 
"Baldwin; Hand Book of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 116^ 
.gBain; The Emotions and the W i l l , p. 91. 
oG. H. Lewes; Problems of Life and Mind, Vol. I I , p. 225.^ 
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that his thinking i s l i t t l e more than a process of feeling, and 
his conception of the spir i t u a l being, are really only theories 
of his feelings. Nor, indeed, does he think of them as separate 
from his feelings. When they originally appear to him, their 
appearance brought feeling with i t . With every reappearance, 
either in dream, in memory, or by misinterpretation of actual 
objective phenomena, those feelings reappear, and i t never 
occurs to him that the two can be separated. He regards his 
feeling as an attribute of these s p i r i t u a l beings, and he finds 
the beinp; in the light of those feelings. So that his religious 
conceptions are,indeed, l i t t l e else than a theory of his religious 
feeling. 
That this is true is suggested by many considerations. Rel-
igion always retains emotion as a larr^e element. True that 
emotion i s of various types, from that of the Guinea Negro who 
-29-
beats his gods, upon occasion, or of the New Zealander who 
threatens to k i l l and eat his god, to that of the enthusiast, who 
offers himself a l i v i n g s a c r i f i c e . The Congo Negroes l i v e in 
x 
perpetual terror of the e v i l s p i r i t s , whom they worship. And 
the Christian walks in serene joy at the presence of his Deity. 
These varying emotions may possibly find their origin i n the 
extreme d i f f i c u l t y of discriminatingbetween certain forms of 
o 
pleasure and certain forms of pain. The original sensations 
were so close to the line that separates the two, that they mi^ht 
easily have been put in one class by one individual, and in another 
class by another. These classifications would easily harden, 
in the process of trad i t i o n . The devotes of each conception, 
would assimilate to i t s religious idea those feelings which are 
/XPeschel; Races of Man, p. 79. 
O^ain; The Emotions and the W i l l , p, 90, 
oJames; Psychology, Vol. I I , p. 545. 
oWard; Dynamic Sociology. 
of the same class, u n t i l there are two f a i r l y definite theories 
of the religious feelings; one, that they are .pleasing, the 
other, that they are unpleasant. In the one class would be 
gendered a desire for their r e p e t i t i o n , i n the other, repugnance 
to them, two states of mind equally f i t t e d to bring about a 
repetition of the feelings. Later on in the development of the 
race, when conceptions of the gods have become d e f i n i t e , and the 
idea of their supernatural power i s expanded, men attribute to 
them their ^ood or i l l i n external a f f a i r s , according as they 
have conceived their characters. However, the element of feeling 
never leaves r e l i g i o n so long as i t remains r e l i g i o n . The savage 
recognizes his r e l i g i o n as consisting largely of f e e l i n g , and when 
he aesires a lar^e experience of i t he gormandizes, or starves, 
or dances, or lashes himself into an ecstacy. The enlightened man 
s i t s down to quiet contemplation. The savage says his gods take 
X take possession of him. The Chr is t ian that he communes with God. 
Even the most thoroughly r a t i o n a l i s t i c of thinkers on r e l i g i o n , 
have never, in tent iona l ly taken from r e l i g i o n i t s element of 
f e e l i n g , even when they f a i l e d to recognize it in word, but have 
regarded i t as flowing from, the re l i g i ous idea and have therefore 
duscussed only the idea^ "But simple ideas which have no 
V,, 
r e l a t i o n to past experiences excite no emotions. They must 
bring up and reproduce feelings already experienced. In other 
words, a condition precedent to the awakening of emotion by the 
contemplation of the re l ig ious idea, i s the past experience of 
a l i k e fee l ing through some actual or imagined r e l a t i o n . And 
this f ee l ing i s the essence of natural r e l i g i o n . Dr. Robert E l i n t 
says, "Rel ig ion is man's communion with what he believes to be God 
l 
of gods." But how can there be c cmnunion with what i s not ? 
X booster Quarterly; December, 1896. 
o F l i n t : Theism, p. 3 4 ( / ^ /, ^ 
v9McCosh; The Divine Government, p. 303. JfttrtcLh $ J*i~ 
lTheism, p. 32. 
And Dr. Flint insists that but one conception of God is well 
founded. Evidently, he should have said "Religion is a feeling, 
which man attributes to his relation, to what he believes to be, 
a God or gods." This feeling it is of which the mind lays 
hold, analyzes as well as it may, and works up into theories of 
religious £ee*£ng-*-f Professor Hermann seems to recognize this 
priority of feeling to idea, when he gives to his late book its 
x ' 
name. But it is Schleiermacher, who while failing to discriminate 
between the true and the false in religion, yet urges the import-
ance of the element of feeling, with most brilliancy and power. 
Evidently, the discrimination between true and false religion, 
in the dogmatic sense, is a discrimination between feelings which 
Ĉommunion with God. 
/Speeches on Religion. 
are produced by a real supernatural being, and those which are 
subjective i n o r i g i n . -?ut i t is for i t s sociological bearing, 
rather than for i t s apologetic ones that I am considering the 
subject. The fact that r e l i g i o n is primarily a matter of feelinr 
is well understood by the religious propogandist$, who always 
appeal^ to the feelings. If asked why, he replies that i t is 
the w i l l whi'-hhe desires to move, and the w i l l i s under the 
dominion of feeling. He reaches feeling, not by appeals to the 
intelligence, but to the emotions, and to these he appe: Is by 
A 
pictures of feelinr^alternately agreeablejand disagreeable. I 
have seen tremendous feeling, and a multitude converted under 
the influence of a song, which conveyed no sort of an idea either 
religious or otherwise. It simply presented to the mind the 
picture of the exhibition of strong feeling, and thus i t produced 
/ 
strong feeling in the listeners. 
X Giddin^s; Principles of Sociology, p. 135. 
/rcOosh; The Oivine Government, p. 303.-
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cmclude then, thrt v o l i t i o n lays hold of a l l the ele-cn 
x 
of the soul: i n t e l l e c t , f o e l i n ^ , and w i l l ; but that the order-
of t h i s entrance i s the ordrr of the development of mind— f i r s t 
f e e l i n g then i n t e l l e c t . P e l i ~ i o u s f e e l i n r s f i r s t , r e l i - i o u s 
ie'e-s second-and reached i n the endeavor to understand the 
fe e l i n -s. 
* F l i n t ' s Trie i s " 

